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The Time is  ow 
On December 31, all commercial banks, 
savings-and-Ioan associations and mutual 
savings banks will be able to offer interest-
bearing checking accounts. These accounts, 
called NOW (Negotiable Order of With-
d raw  a  I) accou nts, cou Id change the natu re of 
banking in this country and affectthe conduct 
of monetary policy. With the advent of na-
tionwide NOW accounts, commercial banks 
and credit unions will no longer be the only 
depository institutions capable of  offering 
interest  -beari ng checki ng-type accou nts 
nationwide. Henceforth, S&L's and mutuals 
will take the opportunity to compete head-
to-head with banks as one-stop family finan-
cial centers. 
Aggressive thrift-institution promotion cam-
paigns will intensify the competition for 
household accounts. (Regulatory authorities 
have set the ceiling interest rate on NOW 
accou nts at 5 % percent, but competition for 
NOW  funds will increasingly center around 
terms for services.) Many consumers, who 
until recently have been denied the oppor-
tunity to earn explicit interest on their check-
ing accounts, will find NOW accounts very 
attractive. As a result, NOW balances are 
likely to grow rapidly. 
Rapid growth in NOW balances will height-
en the uncertainty affecting the conduct of 
monetary policy. In February 1981, the Fed-
eral Reserve will set the growth-rate ranges 
for several measures of the money supply for 
that calendar year. NOW-account growth 
will affect growth in each of  these monetary 
aggregates differently. Thus, in order to 
choose appropriate target ranges, the Fed 
must predict how fast NOW balances will 
grow.and which financial assets will be 
converted to NOWs. NOW accounts thus 
wi  II produce benefits for many households, 
but initially will create difficulties for the Fed 
in its task of selecting long-run target ranges 
for money-supply growth. 
Birth of NOWs 
NOW accounts made their debut in June 
1972 when Consurners Savings, a Massachu-
setts mutual-savings bank, began allowing 
withdrawals from savings accounts by a 
check-like negotiable order of withdrawal. 
By early fall, other mutual savings banks in 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire had fol-
lowed Consumers' lead. Effective January 
1974, Congress authorized all banks and 
thrift institutions in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire to offer NOW accounts. Then, in 
1976, Congress further broadened NOW 
authority to include depository institutions in 
Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island and 
Vermont. NOW accounts proved to be ex-
tremely popular in these six states, growing to 
a level of $2 billion by December 1976 (see 
chart). New York and New Jersey institutions 
began to offer NOWs in 1978 and 1980, 
respectively. 
After several efforts to legalize NOW ac- _ 
counts nationwide, Congress finally granted 
NOW authority (or similar authority) to all 
depository institutions with the enactment of 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act in March, 1980. The 
ceiling interest rate for NOWs, which will be 
available to individuals, households and 
nonprofit organizations, was set at 5% per-
cent for all institutions. This is the same figure 
as the passbook-savings rate at commercial 
banks and 1/4 percent less than the passbook 
rate at thrift institutions. 
Stiff competition 
Although depository institutions cannot ac-
cept NOW deposits ur:til the end of  the year, 
competition for NOW dollars is already 
beginning to heat up. A sizable number of 
banks and savings-and-Ioan associations, 
particularly in the West, have begun to pro-
mote NOWs aggressively. Some S&Ls are 
trying to build a NOW customer base by 
offering preauthorized-transfer and tele-
phone bill-paying accounts that will auto-matically be converted to NOW accounts on 
January 1. But some banks, in their marketing 
efforts, are trying to get a headstart on the 
thrift competition by stressing the similarity of 
their currently-available ATS (Automatic 
Transfer from Savings) accounts to NOW 
accounts. 
The growing intensity of the competition 
among depository institutions is most evident 
in the pricing field, with a wide range of 
minimum balances and service charges 
quoted. Minimum balances necessary to 
avoid service charges on NOW accounts 
range from zero in a few cases to $2,000 or 
more. Some institutions do not require 
minimum NOW balances, but require sub-
stantial balances in other accounts. For the 
NOW account balances orother qualifying 
account balances that fall below the requ ired 
minimum, monthly maintenance charges 
range from $2 to $7, while transactions fees 
range from zero to 15 cents per check. 
Terms thus vary widely, but as a group, 
savings-and-Ioan associations are pricing 
their NOW accounts more liberally than 
commercial banks. Many of the major Cali-
fornia banks, for example, have announced 
that the minimum NOW balance necessary 
to avoid service charges will be $1,500 to 
$2,000, while some of the larger California 
S&Ls will require only $500 to $1,000. The 
reason for this disparity in terms is a differ-
ence in the way the different institutions view 
NOW accounts. Many banks do not view 
NOWsas a means of  expanding their deposit 
bases, but as a means of  protecting their pres-
ent deposits. After all, bankers are not eager 
to see all of their regular zero-interest de-
mand-deposit.accounts switch to NOWs. By 
offering a wide variety of services in addition 
to NOW accounts (such as conveniently-
located branch offices, automated-teller 
machines, etc.), banks may be able to retain a 
high proportion of  their deposits in spite of 
less liberal terms. Since banks will incur 
higher costs by offering these services with 
their NOWs, many are prepared to let their 
less profitable, lower-balance accounts 
switch to S&Ls. 
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Savings-and-Ioan associations, on the other 
hand, are generally eager to see their NOW 
balances grow, because they view NOW 
accounts as a means of increasing their mar-
ket share relative to banks. Some S&L execu-
tives reason that NOW funds are more likel.y 
to come from bank demand-deposit accounts 
than from their own passbook-savings ac-
counts. They are attracted to this new source 
of  funds. in spite of processing costs and 
reserve requirements, because it is less 
expensive than borrowing from Federal 
Home Loan Banks or paying 12 to 14 percent 
for funds in the money and capital markets. 
The most important reason for S&L pricing 
behavior, however, may be their recognition 
of  the opportunities available from com-
peting head-to-head with banks for house-
hold funds. The ability to offer checking 
accounts, S&Ls contend, is the key to their 
ability to retain their share of passbook sav-
ings, since the convenience of  one-stop 
banking is a key factor in household deci-
sions about where to put their funds. Despite 
their ability to offer Y4-percent more than 
banks on savings-deposit-interest, the thrifts' 
share of  passbook savings has declined stead-
ily from 65 percent in 1966 to 53 percent in 
September 1980, although their share of 
small time deposits has moved in the oppo-
site direction. Thus, because of a desire to 
acquire new funds and regain their share of 
savings funds, savings-and-Ioan associations 
are pricing their NOW accounts lower than 
banks' NOW accounts. This pricing strategy 
means that S&Ls are likely to gain a large 
number of  accounts, but that the average 
balance in those accounts may well be lower 
than in bank-held NOWs. 
Pricing strategies 
Bankers are concerned that S&Ls and mutuals 
are adopting an overly aggressive price stra-
tegy, either because the thrifts lack exper-
ience in pricing checking-type accounts, or 
because the thrifts are deliberately sacrificing 
short-run profits to gain market share. (Of 
course, underpricing makes sense from the 
thrifts' perspective only if the deposits they 
lure away from banks do not switch back !liMillions 
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once prices are raised to cover costs.) If these 
institutions are underpricing their NOW 
accounts, banks may be forced to do the 
same, so that aggregate financial-institution 
profits will decline. 
The evidence from the New England exper-
ience is somewhat mixed. By 1976, most 
savings banks in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire offered free NOW accounts pay-
ing the maximum (5 percent) interest rate. 
Commercial banks, on the other hand, of-
fered NOWs paying 5 percent but required a 
minimum balance to avoid service charges. 
Despite the desire to catch up with the sav-
ings banks, commercial banks generally did 
not succumb to the pressure to offer free 
NOWs. Somewhat surprisingly, then, com-
mercial banks' share of NOW balances in 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire grew 
throughout this period, reaching 57 percent 
by December 1976. 
Despite this more conservative pricing stra-
tegy, NOW accounts may have been more 
harmful to New England commercia! banks' 
profitability, both in the short run and over the 
longer run, than to mutual-savings banks' 
profitability. Commercial banks in Massa-
chusetts and New Hampshire were generally 
much more profitable than their thrift com-
petitors before the introduction of NOW 
accounts, and NOW  accounts thus may have 
served to narrow the gap. This result is con-
sistent with the thrifts' argument that the 
ability to offer checking accounts makes it 
possible for them to compete much more 
effectively with commercial banks. 
Monitoring the M's 
Aggressive promotion of NOW accounts will 
cause NOW  balances to grow very rapidly in 
1981, creating difficulties for the Federal 
Reserve in its task of  setting growth-rate target 
ranges for the monetC!ry aggregates. The Fed 
must predict not only how fast NOWs will 
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grow, but whether NOW growth will come 
primarily at the expense of growth in check-
ing accounts or growth in savings deposits. 
Shifts from traditional checking acounts to 
NOWs will cause M-1A, which includes 
commercial-bank checking accounts, to 
grow more slowly than in the past. However, 
shifts from savings and other accounts to 
NOWs will cause the M-1 B aggregate, which 
includes M-OiA and other checkable deposits 
(pri mari Iy ATS and NOW), to grow faster than 
in the past without changingthe rate of. 
growth in M-1A. 
The New England experience suggests that 
roughly two-thirds of NOW balances come 
from checking accounts, and that the re-
mainder come from other financial assets, 
primarily savings. NOW  growth in 1981 may 
well repeatthis general pattern, since the 
minimum-balance pricing of NOWs encour-
ages consumers to combine checking and 
savings funds. Therefore, growth in NOW 
balances is likely to depress M-1 A growth as 
funds are shifted out of  traditional checking 
accounts, and to boost M-1 B growth as funds 
are shifted out of savings and other interest- -
earning assets. 
In light of  the potential for substantial shifts of 
funds following the introduction of nation-
wide NOW accounts, there will be less cer-
tainty than usual in the expectations of rel-
ative growth of  the aggregates that the Federal 
Reserve builds into its money-growth targets. 
For this reason, the Fed has indicated that 
caution is necessary in interpreting the initial 
1981 targets. As Chairman Volckersaid in his 
monetary-pol icy report to Congress last Ju Iy, 
the Fed wi  II seek reduced rates of monetary 
growth over the long run, but the range for 
M-l B, in particular, may have to accom-
modate a period of abnormal growth as the 
public adjusts to NOW accounts. 
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IiANKING DATA-TWELfTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
8,172  6.0 
9,083  8.1 
3,789  11.8 
6,882  16.2 
292  - 1.2 
269  - 17.5 
682  9.3 
229  - 1.5 
550  1.2 
1,132  3.6 
392  1.4 
9,570  16.4 
9,058  18.2 
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